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Notes
Saving the Sinking Ship: How the United States
Can Create an Effective Content Moderation Policy
by Looking Abroad
ZHI YANG TAN†
Each day, the world creates another 2.5 quintillion bytes of data, with most of it being
accessible by the average person through the smartphone they carry in their pocket. That
data may often take the form of informative new articles or funny cat videos, but also hidden
within that sea of information is content designed for more malicious purposes. While much
of the world, and especially the U.S., has historically taken a laissez-faire approach to
moderating online content, such an approach is quickly becoming outdated and ineffective
as more people are exposed to disinformation or hate speech online, which can have effects
that spill over into the real world. Governments and platforms are therefore facing the
difficult problem of how to best limit this harmful content while not stifling the power of the
internet as a tool for expression. Many other countries in the last decade have begun
abandoning the laissez-faire approach and are developing their own solutions to online
content moderation.
This Note presents an international typography of those approaches. It groups them into
three general categories: platform-focused regulations meant to encourage platforms to
properly moderate, user-focused regulations that punish citizens that create or
disseminate harmful content, and education-based reforms that aim to create a more
informed populace. Then, it examines in detail how each are implemented and their
potential strengths and weaknesses. Finally, it proposes potential reforms for the U.S.
that combines all three approaches in a way that empowers governments, platforms, and
citizens themselves to address the problems cooperatively without engaging in statesponsored censorship and abandoning important free speech principles in the process.

† J.D. Candidate 2022, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Senior Communications
Editor, Hastings Law Journal. The Author would like to thank Professor Chimène Keitner for her invaluable
guidance and feedback throughout the entire writing process, as well as all the HLJ editors that reviewed this
Note to make it the best it can be.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the internet has become an
integral part of everyday life for over half of the world’s population.1 It enables
global communication, online marketplaces, and perhaps most important,
content creation. In the last ten years, American internet usage has become
increasingly mobile, with over 85% of Americans having access to the internet
through the smartphone they carry around with them every day.2 But this
technological revolution comes with a cost. Those with ill intentions are given
immense power to promulgate ideas that they otherwise would not be able to
promulgate. This is because entry barriers that traditionally surrounded content
creation suddenly came crumbling down, and now everyone has equal
opportunity and power to create. As such, governments and private corporations
around the world have been asking a big question: what is the best way to
moderate user-created content online?
This Note addresses the various international approaches that have been
taken towards solving the problem of content moderation problems, specifically
regarding the rise of misinformation and disinformation online, and how those
approaches could be applied to an American content moderation policy
overhaul. Section I briefly discusses the roots of internet regulation in the U.S.,
and how a commitment to laissez-faire moderation has created an environment
that encourages free expression but has also given rise to the use of the internet
for malicious goals. Section II discusses the current landscape of the internet,
and how its structure has allowed harmful content to thrive online. Section III
discusses recent attempts to solve the content moderation problems, and various
issues and considerations in content moderation that function as limitations on
policy. Section IV analyzes the three main approaches to content moderation
seen abroad and discusses the various benefits and drawbacks to each approach.
And finally, Section V provides a framework for a possible solution in the U.S.
centered around a combination of solutions enacted by governments and
platforms alike.
I. THE HISTORY OF ONLINE CONTENT REGULATION
In the early days of the internet,3 users, service providers, and regulators
faced a problem: who was responsible for the content that was posted online?
Legal precedent involving traditional print media held publishers liable for false
or libelous content they published because they had direct control and
1. Global Digital Population as of January 2021, STATISTA (Sept. 10, 2021), https://www.statista.com/
statistics/617136/digital-population-worldwide.
2. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/
mobile.
3. While the Internet was originally developed as a military communications network, the Internet as we
know it today, and for the purposes of this Note, truly began in 1989, when Tim Berners-Lee created the World
Wide Web, allowing individual end-users to share information online. History of the Web, WORLD WIDE WEB
FOUND., https://webfoundation.org/about/vision/history-of-the-web (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
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knowledge over the publications, while the distributors of those materials could
not be liable because of their lack of control.4 However, it was unclear how the
roles of publisher and distributor would be applied on the internet, where
websites often played both. In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. (“Cubby”), the
Southern District of New York held that CompuServe, an online information
service that had “little or no editorial control” over the user-generated
publications it hosted, was more akin to a distributor and was thus not liable for
an allegedly libelous newsletter that it hosted on its servers.5 However, in
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services, Co., the New York Supreme Court
in Nassau County held that Prodigy Services (“Prodigy”), another online
information service, could be liable for a libelous post against Stratton Oakmont
made by an unidentified bulletin board user because Prodigy was engaging in at
least basic content moderation for the board.6 Their use of content guidelines,
software screening for offensive language, and the existence of an “emergency
delete function” for when Prodigy felt that a post needed to be removed were
enough for the court to differentiate it from Cubby, and hold that it was a
publisher by virtue of its editorial control over the bulletin board content.7
These cases came to the attention of Chris Cox, a United States
Representative from California, who thought that both cases were incorrectly
decided.8 He believed that forcing companies to choose between not moderating
their content at all and avoiding any liability, or moderating their content to
promote platform health and then being held liable for what users out of their
direct control were posting, would turn the internet into the “Wild West[,] and
nobody would have any incentive to keep the internet civil.”9 To solve this issue,
Cox and fellow representative Ron Wyden from Oregon introduced the
Communications Decency Act, which itself was an addition to the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.10 Section 230(c), of the act reads as follows:
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.”11

Often referred to as simply “Section 230,” these words created an almost
impervious shield for service providers against liability for content their users
created.12 Additionally, no service provider could be held liable for any good
4. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959).
5. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
6. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs., Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *2, *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
7. Id. at *3–4.
8. Matt Reynolds, The Strange Story of Section 230, the Obscure Law that Created our Flawed, Broken
Internet, WIRED (Mar. 24, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/section-230-communicationsdecency-act.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
12. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/
cda230 (last visited Jan. 24, 2022) (“In other words, online intermediaries that host or republish speech are
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faith attempts to remove material that was obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.13 For the time being,
this seemed to solve the dilemma—companies were now free to moderate usergenerated content on their sites without the fear of being treated as the publisher
of that content.
Section 230 greatly shaped the landscape of the early internet. By shielding
companies from liability, it encouraged the development of internet
intermediaries14 with business models centered around providing access to an
unlimited ocean of user-generated content, rather than their own novel content.15
Because these protections were unique to American law at the time, and because
places like Silicon Valley were becoming international hubs for the latest in
technological innovation, the U.S. became the place to be for companies that
wanted to create web-based services.16 Some of the biggest intermediaries—
Google, Facebook, Amazon—were founded and are still headquartered in the
U.S., and therefore subject to U.S. laws.17 In total, the U.S. economy’s internet
sector employs 425,000 people and contributes forty-four billion dollars to gross
domestic product because of these and similar other protections.18
II. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF THE INTERNET
But this explosive growth of the internet has its downsides. Before the
internet, very few people had access to a platform with which they could
broadcast their thoughts to the world. Now, anyone with an internet-connected
device can access social media, post on forums, or write blogs about whatever
is on their mind. As the Supreme Court held in Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, the internet allows anyone to “become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.”19 And while this certainly was
a powerful tool, and one that has been essential to the triumphs of democracies
over dictatorships,20 it has also enabled those with malicious intent to abuse that

protected against a range of laws that might otherwise be used to hold them legally responsible for what others
say and do.”).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
14. Internet intermediaries are defined as companies that bring together or facilitate transactions between
third parties on the internet. CHRISTIAN DIPPON, ECONOMIC VALUE OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES AND THE
ROLE OF LIABILITY PROTECTIONS 3 (2017).
15. Stephen Engelberg, Twenty-Six Words Created the Internet. What Will It Take to Save It?, PROPUBLICA
(Feb. 9, 2021, 2:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/nsu-section-230.
16. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, supra note 12.
17. Sue Chang, U.S. Companies Really Do Rule the Tech World—Here’s the Chart to Prove It,
MARKETWATCH (Oct. 8, 2018, 12:07 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-companies-really-do-rulethe-tech-worldheres-the-chart-to-prove-it-2018-10-08.
18. DIPPON, supra note 14, at 2.
19. Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
20. The internet and social media have been of particular importance in political revolutions in the last
decade, including the Arab Spring. See Kali Robinson, The Arab Spring at Ten Years: What’s the Legacy of the
Uprisings?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Dec. 3, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/article/arab-spring-tenyears-whats-legacy-uprisings.

534

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:2

power and create harmful content, and harm others on both the individual and
community level.
Unlimited access to information has made it necessary for people to filter
that information to easily digestible amounts. But that filtering process is never
completely neutral, and users may trend towards creating their own personal
echo chambers by self-selecting the information they want to see and ignoring
the rest. Researchers from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have found
that shared partisanship (in their experiment, political ideology) has a causal
effect on the social ties that people form with one another.21 In another study,
researchers found that Facebook users tended to “seek out and receive
information that strengthens their preferred narrative.”22
The effect of these echo chambers is worsened further through algorithms
designed to keep users engaged with websites. Today, companies gather large
sums of data on their consumers—their likes, dislikes, interests, and habits—
that allows them to curate content that algorithms determine to be potentially
interesting.23 Progressive iterations will curate the feed further to ensure
maximum engagement by the user, and by extension maximum profits for adsupported platforms.24 In the end, social media feeds become primarily
populated with information that conforms to the user’s biases,25 further
secluding them in the echo chamber.
And so, within these individualized echo chambers, an inherent desire to
seek out information that conforms to one’s beliefs and a system designed to
feed a user with that information join forces to induce the spread of
misinformation and disinformation, perhaps the most pervasive type of harmful
content online today.26 Trust in traditional news media has fallen significantly
over the past few years, with only 46% of Americans in 2021 reporting that they
trusted traditional media.27 Instead, Americans are increasingly turning to social
21. Mohsen Mosleh, Cameron Martel, Dean Eckles, & David G. Rand, Shared Partisanship Dramatically
Increases Social Tie Formation in a Twitter Field Experiment, 118 PNAS, no. 7, 2021, at 2.
22. Walter Quattrociocchi, Antonio Scala, & Cass Sunstein, Echo Chambers on Facebook 14 (June 13,
2016) (Discussion Paper No. 877) (on file with Harvard University, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics,
and Business), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Sunstein_877.pdf.
23. Sang Ah Kim, Social Media Algorithms: Why You See What You See, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 147, 147
(2017).
24. Id.; see also David Bauder & Michael Liedtke, Whistleblower: Facebook Chose Profit Over Public
Safety, A.P. NEWS (Oct. 4, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/facebook-whistleblower-frances-haugen4a3640440769d9a241c47670facac213.
25. Christopher Seneca, How to Break Out of Your Social Media Echo Chamber, WIRED (Sept. 17, 2020,
9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-twitter-echo-chamber-confirmation-bias (“The algorithms
ignore the recency and frequency of what our friends are posting and instead focus on what we ‘like,’ ‘retweet,’
and ‘share’ to keep feeding content that is similar to what we’ve indicated makes us comfortable.”).
26. Misinformation is false or out-of-context information presented as fact. Disinformation is a type of
misinformation created with the specific intent to deceive its audience. Meira Gebel, Misinformation vs.
Disinformation: What to Know About Each Form of False Information, and How to Spot them Online, BUS.
INSIDER (Jan. 15, 2021, 1:02 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/misinformation-vs-disinformation.
27. Felix Salmon, Media Trust Hits New Low, AXIOS (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.axios.com/media-trustcrisis-2bf0ec1c-00c0-4901-9069-e26b21c283a9.html.
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media,28 where the truth of posts can be hard to verify given their often usergenerated nature. A 2019 survey by Ipsos found that 86% of people globally
believe that they have been exposed to fake news, with another 86% of that
group reporting initially believing what they saw.29
While a fake image of a former president soiling himself on a golf course30
may be relatively harmless and perhaps even funny, the spread of
misinformation and disinformation can have significant real-world effects when
it encourages behavior that adversely affects others. This has been especially
evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, where a wave of misinformation and
disinformation surrounding the pandemic and various actions by health officials
led international bodies to dub the phenomenon as its own “infodemic.”31
Almost two-thirds of Americans reported seeing news about the disease that
seemed made up.32 For example, a viral post from March 2020 alleging that a
nationwide lockdown would be announced per the Robert T. Stafford Act33 was
one of many incidents that contributed to grocery store shelves being cleared out
nationwide.34 Studies have predicted that disinformation campaigns regarding
the safety of COVID-19 vaccines may also be strong predictors of lowered
vaccination rates in the future.35
More importantly, though, disinformation presents an existential threat to
democracy. A system of government built on the will of the people requires
citizens to be knowledgeable and informed so that they can make the best
possible decisions. But this requirement can be and has been subject to abuse.
For example, disinformation campaigns have been a favored tactic of Russia,
which has used them since the fall of the Soviet Union.36 While Russian
disinformation has typically been targeted at its European interests, in the last
28. Darrell West, How to Combat Fake News and Disinformation, BROOKINGS. (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation.
29. Sean Simpson, Fake News: A Global Epidemic Vast Majority (86%) of Online Global Citizens Have
Been Exposed to It, IPSOS (June 11, 2019), https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/cigi-fake-news-globalepidemic.
30. Dan Evon, Did President Trump Experience Diarrhea on a Golf Course?, SNOPES (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/trump-diarrhea-golf-course.
31. World Health Organization, Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Situation Report – 13, at 2 (2020);
António Guterres (@antonioguterres), TWITTER (Mar. 27, 2020, 8:55 PM), https://twitter.com/antonioguterres/
status/1243748397019992065.
32. Christina Pazzanese, Battling the ‘Pandemic of Misinformation,’ HARV. GAZETTE (May 8, 2020),
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/05/social-media-used-to-spread-create-covid-19-falsehoods.
33. Reuters Staff, False Claim: A Text Says Trump to Declare Mandatory Quarantine Under the Stafford
Act, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-factcheck-quarantine-stafford-act/falseclaim-a-text-says-trump-to-declare-mandatory-quarantine-under-the-stafford-act-idUSKBN2153UR.
34. James Peltz & Sam Dean, Sales Are Up at Supermarkets. But that Brings New Problems for the Grocery
Industry, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-03-15/grocery-storeindustry-coronavirus.
35. Steven Reinberg, Lies Spread on Social Media Hamper Vaccinations, WEBMD (Oct. 30, 2020),
https://www.webmd.com/vaccines/covid-19-vaccine/news/20201030/lies-spread-on-social-media-may-meanfewer-vaccinations.
36. Neil MacFarquhar, A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29/world/europe/russia-sweden-disinformation.html.
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three U.S. election cycles, Russia and other foreign countries have repeatedly
attempted to create discord among U.S. voters through social media
disinformation campaigns.37 Notably, they did this by creating fake accounts to
make posts that simply “stir the informational pot” by taking advantage of
divisive topics.38 While the effect these campaigns have had on political
polarization is potentially limited,39 they still highlight the fact that social
media’s ubiquity allows for attempts at large-scale democratic interference that
can go virtually unnoticed on social media.
III. LOOKING FOR THE FIX
A. CONTEMPORARY SOLUTIONS TO CONTENT MODERATION
As of 2021, Section 230 is still controlling law. But it draws almost
universal disdain from the political spectrum because it removes almost all
liability for intermediaries. It notoriously shielded companies from liability
when their services were used for threatening fellow employees,40 housing
discrimination,41 and even coordinating terrorist attacks overseas.42 The shield
that was originally supposed to encourage moderation now seems to protect
intermediaries even when they fail to take proper steps to prevent abuse of their
services. Attempts at content moderation now seem to be prompted more so by
societal outrage against the platforms, rather than a genuine desire to keep those
platforms safe for users.43
The current state of online content moderation affairs is therefore a
disjointed, laissez-faire system of internet governance, where the government
has taken a back seat to let intermediaries themselves find a solution to moderate
harmful content on their own platforms. Depending on the situation, platforms
have been known to remove content, relocate content, directly edit content, add
warnings for readers, add alternative perspectives, or disable comments.44 But
37. NAT’L INTEL. COUNCIL, FOREIGN THREATS TO THE 2020 US FEDERAL ELECTIONS i (2021),
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.
38. Joshua Yaffa, Is Russian Meddling as Dangerous as We Think?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/09/14/is-russian-meddling-as-dangerous-as-we-think.
39. Joshua A. Tucker, Andrew Guess, Pablo Barberá, Cristian Vaccari, Alexandra Siegel, Sergey
Sanovich, Denis Stukal, & Brendan Nyhan, Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation:
A Review of the Scientific Literature, HEWLETT FOUND. 15 (2018) (“Exposure to political disagreement on social
media appears to be high, internet access and social media usage are not correlated with increases in polarization,
and misinformation appears to have only limited effects on citizens’ levels of political knowledge.”) (citations
omitted).
40. Delfino v. Agilent Techs., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790, 795 (Ct. App. 2006).
41. Chi. Laws’ Comm. for C.R. Under Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008).
42. Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 71 (2d. Cir. 2019).
43. Julia Carrie Wong & Olivia Solon, Facebook Releases Content Moderation Guidelines – Rules Long
Kept Secret, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2018, 6:14 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/24/
facebook-releases-content-moderation-guidelines-secret-rules (“The disclosure comes amid a publicity blitz by
the company to regain users’ trust following the Observer’s revelation in March that the personal Facebook data
of tens of millions of users was improperly obtained by a political consultancy.”).
44. Eric Goldman, Content Moderation Remedies, MICH. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming).
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the application of these methods is often piecemeal and confusing, with vague
definitions about what content is considered harmful and what should be done
about it. Further complicating the issue is the fact that moderation is inherently
influenced by the moderator’s own beliefs and biases, which can introduce
inconsistencies in enforcement, even within one platform.
One popular way for platforms to introduce consistency into their
moderation processes is to publish universal community standards or guidelines:
a set of rules or principles that dictate what kinds of content is considered
appropriate. Every user is made aware of the community standards as part of
their user agreement, and users agree to allow platforms to remove content they
post that violates those standards.45 But there is no standardized set of rules
between platforms, leading to user confusion over what is appropriate or
inappropriate on any given platform. For example, YouTube’s policies contain
an explicit ban on COVID-19 information that contradicts the WHO or any local
health authorities, with videos found to violate this policy are completely
removed from the site.46 On the other hand, Facebook’s community standards
do not explicitly prevent the posting of misinformation, and instead simply note
that posts that are internally deemed to contain fake news will be shown lower
in user feeds.47
In addition, social media platforms have trended away from a model of
meticulous community moderation to more large-scale commercial content
moderation.48 This was prompted by the sheer amount of material that needs to
be screened for harmful content.49 While sites like Reddit primarily use a
combination of paid employees and volunteer moderators from the community,
others like Twitter and YouTube now pride themselves on algorithmic
moderation (separate from the algorithms that curate feeds) through systems that
automatically classify content and determine whether they conform to
community standards.50 However, the workings of these systems are often black
boxes that have no oversight or transparency by those outside of the company.51

45. Terms
of
Service,
YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/
static?template=terms (last visited Jan. 24, 2022) (“If we reasonably believe that any Content is in breach of this
Agreement or may cause harm to YouTube, our users, or third parties, we may remove or take down that Content
in our discretion.”); Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/tos (last visited Jan. 24, 2022) (“We
reserve the right to remove Content that violates the User Agreement, including for example, copyright or
trademark violations or other intellectual property misappropriation, impersonation, unlawful conduct, or
harassment.”).
46. COVID-19 Medical Misinformation Policy, YOUTUBE (May 20, 2020), https://support.google.com/
youtube/answer/9891785.
47. False
News,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/
false_news (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
48. Robert Gorwa, Reuben Binns, & Christian Katzenbach, Algorithmic Content Moderation: Technical
and Political Challenges in the Automation of Platform Governance, BIG DATA & SOC’Y 2 (2020).
49. Katie Zigelman, Why Use AI for Content Moderation, SPECTRUM LABS (Aug. 10, 2019),
https://www.spectrumlabsai.com/the-blog/2019/8/10/why-use-ai-for-moderation.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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Notably, since 2016, various conservative figures have voiced concerns about
moderation bias against their posts,52 though whether that is truly the case is
unclear.53 And furthermore, algorithmic moderation is still in its infancy, leading
to some of the same inconsistencies it was meant to solve.54
This, combined with a seeming lack of effectiveness in stopping the spread
of harmful content, has led to criticism of this new trend towards algorithmic
moderation. Tarleton Gillespie, Principal Researcher at Microsoft, argues that
the shift towards these algorithms, especially with newer tech companies, has
been partially motivated by venture capital.55 Investors, especially those looking
for the next tech unicorn, have a willingness to reward clever and novel software
design, rather than systems that are effective at tackling the problems they were
designed to solve.56
Platforms themselves are also voicing concerns that in the current
regulatory environment, they are simply not well-suited to handle the sheer
breadth and complexity of these moderation challenges on their own.57
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg has personally called for regulators to step in
and guide companies like his own on the best way to engage in content
moderation.58 In the last few years, there have been various suggestions for
fixing intermediary liability to encourage stronger content moderation, such as

52. Bill Chappell & Anastasia Tsioulcas, YouTube, Apple and Facebook Ban Infowars, Which Decries
‘Mega Purge’, NPR (Aug. 6, 2018, 2:19 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/06/636030043/youtube-apple-andfacebook-ban-infowars-which-decries-mega-purge; see also Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 999
(9th Cir. 2020) (“PragerU prophesizes living under the tyranny of big-tech, possessing the power to censor any
speech it does not like.”).
53. Jennifer Graham, Is Google Biased Against Conservatives?, DESERET NEWS (Aug. 14, 2020, 10:00
PM), https://www.deseret.com/indepth/2020/8/14/21362500/is-google-biased-against-conservatives-breitbartnews-donald-trump-utah-mike-lee; Alison Durkee, Are Social Media Companies Biased Against Conservatives?
There’s No Solid Evidence, Report Concludes, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2021, 1:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
alisondurkee/2021/02/01/are-social-media-companies-biased-against-conservatives-theres-no-solid-evidencereport-concludes. Indiana Attorney General Todd Rokita announced on April 7, 2021 that the state would be
launching an investigation into moderation practices. Lawrence Andrea, AG Todd Rokita Investigating Big Tech
Over What He Says is Conservative ‘Censorship’, INDYSTAR (Apr. 7, 2021, 7:55 AM),
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/crime/2021/04/07/todd-rokita-investigating-facebook-google-appletwitter/7120371002.
54. James Vincent, YouTube Brings Back More Human Moderators After AI Systems Over-Censor, THE
VERGE (Sept. 21, 2020, 10:45 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/9/21/21448916/youtube-automatedmoderation-ai-machine-learning-increased-errors-takedowns.
55. Sudhir Venkatesh, “Someone Needs to Save the World from Silicon Valley”, FREAKONOMICS: SUDHIR
BREAKS THE INTERNET, at 25:50 (Apr. 26, 2020), https://freakonomics.com/podcast/someone-needs-to-savethe-world-from-silicon-valley.
56. Id.
57. Sebastian Herrera, Tech Giants’ New Appeal to Governments: Please Regulate Us, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
27, 2020, 7:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tech-giants-new-appeal-to-governments-please-regulate-us11580126502 (“‘These are the kinds of things that need to arrive at legislative solutions, versus individual CEOs
of individual companies having to sort of come up with answers to what is a big, massive, societal challenge,’
he said.”).
58. Mark Zuckerberg, The Internet Needs New Rules. Let’s Start in These Four Areas., WASH. POST (Mar.
30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mark-zuckerberg-the-internet-needs-new-rules-lets-startin-these-four-areas/2019/03/29/9e6f0504-521a-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.html.
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assigning new duties to internet companies to their users,59 but Congress has yet
to agree on a course of action. Even since just the beginning of 2020, dozens of
bills have been introduced in both houses, with each bill taking its own slightly
different approach to the issue.60 The 2020 bipartisan EARN IT (Eliminating
Abusive and Rampant Neglect of Interactive Technologies) Act was possibly
the most high-profile of these bills, but it received widespread public criticism
for its potential to create a backdoor for law enforcement to access encrypted
user conversations.61
The result of all of this? An environment where malicious users are often
protected from the repercussions of their actions, and where governments are
eager but powerless to hold the companies that give those users a platform
legally responsible. This is undoubtedly the perfect environment for the creation
and dissemination of harmful content. The ship that is the internet is fast sinking,
but no one has the right tools or the individual power to save it. The 1990’s
approach of giving the intermediaries themselves protection and lenience has
simply been outmoded by advances in technology and the growth of the internet,
and thus a new solution is necessary.
B. IMPORTANT ISSUES FOR NEW REGULATIONS TO ADDRESS
Any new attempt to reform content moderation must first overcome a few
key hurdles to implementation. First, and perhaps foremost, is a concern over
authority: who should set the rules, and to what extent should platforms be
regulated by third parties? While terms like misinformation or disinformation
can have general definitions, there needs to be a consistent set of guidelines that
platforms use to determine whether a specific piece of content meets that
definition for there to be consistent enforcement across different platforms and
different situations. Who will create those guidelines? Leaving it to a legislature
or regulatory agency is a common approach, but it might not be the best solution.
These bodies are often tasked with and strive to make rules that broad enough to
allow for more flexible interpretation. This could result in a variety of outcomes,
ranging from confusion over the meaning of certain standards, to potential abuse
of vagueness to justify questionable moderation practices. Additionally, because
people in these political bodies are distanced from the actual task of
enforcement, and typically have no experience in the field themselves, it runs
the risk of creating rules that look good on paper but are difficult to enforce. And
lastly, the ideological makeup of these bodies changes as elections come and go,
59. MARK WARNER, POTENTIAL POLICY PROPOSAL FOR REGULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA AND
TECHNOLOGY FIRMS 6–7 (2018).
60. Kiran Jeevanjee, Brian Lim, Irene Ly, Matt Perault, Jenna Ruddock, Tim Schmeling, Niharika
Vattikonda, & Joyce Zhu, All the Ways Congress Wants to Change Section 230, SLATE (Mar. 23, 2021, 5:45
AM), https://slate.com/technology/2021/03/section-230-reform-legislative-tracker.html.
61. Riana Pfefferkorn, The EARN IT Act: How to Ban End-to-End Encryption Without Actually Banning
It, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT STAN. L. SCH. (Jan. 30, 2020, 12:42 PM), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/
2020/01/earn-it-act-how-ban-end-end-encryption-without-actually-banning-it.
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leading to potential instability in the rules with every change in administration.
As such, requiring Congress, or perhaps the Federal Communications
Commission, to develop detailed and binding standards for content moderation
poses a significant amount of risk.
On the other hand, it may also not be wise to give the platforms themselves
significant leeway in determining these guidelines. Currently, there are few
limitations governing how Twitter, YouTube, or any intermediary chooses to
establish its community guidelines. This gives platforms the freedom to tailor
moderation to the specific platform and its users, but that too can cause issues.
Corporations that are primarily driven by delivering profits to their shareholders
and thus have an interest in gaining more power and control over their users
through collected data62 and may be influenced by ulterior motives separate and
in contention with an interest in platform safety and integrity.63
The second main concern for potential solutions is the effect of
intermediary liability laws and content moderation requirements on free speech.
Justice Clarence Thomas argued in his Biden v. Knight Institute concurrence that
“applying old doctrines to new digital platforms is rarely straightforward,”64 and
noted that private digital platforms wield a significant amount of power to cut
off speech that could potentially be subject to First Amendment scrutiny.65 The
chief precedent in this area is Marsh v. Alabama, where the Supreme Court held
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments could be applied to private actors as
well as state actors if the private actor engages in the same actions that a
government might.66 Some argue67 that social media platforms may fall under
that rule, given that they play an increasingly important role in areas traditionally
run by the government, like education68 or elections.69 In other cases, the
Supreme Court has recognized cyberspace as a protected space under the First

62. Heather Kelly, Google’s Data Collection is Hard to Escape, Study Claims, CNN BUS. (Aug. 21, 2018,
12:26 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/08/21/technology/google-data-collection/index.html.
63. Shannon Bond, Over 400 Advertisers Hit Pause On Facebook, Threatening $70 Billion Juggernaut,
NPR (July 1, 2020, 11:44 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/01/885853634/big-brands-abandon-facebookthreatening-to-derail-a-70b-advertising-juggernaut.
64. Biden v. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Colum. Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1221 (2021) (mem) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
65. Id. at 1224–25.
66. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (“The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and
constitutional rights of those who use it.”).
67. See Paul Domer, Note, De Facto State Action: Social Media Networks and the First Amendment,
95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 923 (2019).
68. Gerrit De Vynck & Mark Bergen, Google Classroom Users Doubled as Quarantines Spread,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2020, 4:45 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-09/google-widenslead-in-education-market-as-students-rush-online.
69. Sara Fischer, Over 3 Million U.S. Voters have Already Registered on Social Media, AXIOS (Sept. 21,
2020), https://www.axios.com/over-3-million-us-voters-already-registered-on-social-media-4db1b2eb-058e43a9-899d-7f0ba8b49664.html.
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Amendment because of how it enables communication for citizens and
government officials alike.70
If these decisions are correct, and the First Amendment truly does limit the
scope of moderation of speech made online, then platforms must be wary of how
content moderation might infringe on a user’s free speech rights. Pushing the
limits of moderation too far may set off an avalanche of First Amendment
challenges, especially if the government is playing too big of a role in said
moderation. To be sure, traditional exceptions to the First Amendment like
incitement or libel would also still apply in such a situation,71 but apart from
these particularized exceptions, moderation could be frustrated by an interest in
protecting free speech.
IV. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO CONTENT MODERATION
To find workable solutions, it may be helpful to look abroad for inspiration.
Various foreign governments began taking steps towards playing a part in the
content moderation process, leading to many different approaches and many
different results. The United States can draw from these, and policymakers can
use them to inform themselves about the costs and benefits of any course of
action.72 No foreign approaches are perfect, and many are deeply flawed, but
they nevertheless provide case studies as to how different types of regulations
might operate, and how public discourse and opinion could be affected.
The approaches can generally be grouped into three main categories: (1)
regulation of platforms, (2) regulation of users, and (3) education to prevent the
effects of harmful content. Importantly, the three are not mutually exclusive;
countries often use a combination of some or all the approaches as part of a
broader plan for regulation. However, this typology will focus on each named
country’s most prominent content moderation strategy.
A. PLATFORM-FOCUSED REGULATIONS
Increasing the amount of regulation for intermediaries is perhaps the most
intuitive approach of the three. Much of the world originally took a cue from the
early development of the internet in the U.S. and established liability shields like

70. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017); Knight First Amendment Inst. at
Colum. Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 238 (2d. Cir. 2019), vacated as moot, Biden v. Knight First Amendment
Inst. at Colum. Univ., 141 S.Ct. 1220 (2021).
71. See Knight, 928 F.3d at 237 (citing Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011))
(“‘[W]hatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever–advancing technology, “the basic principles
of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary” when a new and different
medium for communication appears.’”).
72. Daphne Keller, For Platform Regulation Congress Should Use a European Cheat Sheet, THE HILL
(Jan. 15, 2021, 1:00 PM) https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/534411-for-platform-regulation-congressshould-use-a-european-cheat-sheet.
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Section 230.73 But these days, if intermediaries and the services they provide are
the conduits for the spread of harmful content, then they logically should be the
focus of new regulation. This approach is by far the most popular internationally,
and generally takes the form of legislation that imposes liability and new
obligations on intermediaries and incentivizes them to engage in more
moderation.
Most notably, the European Union recently proposed the Digital Services
Act, designed to add new obligations to companies operating in Europe
depending on their services and user base size.74 The largest online platforms
(defined as those that have over forty-five million users in Europe) would be
subjected to the full gamut of obligations, including cooperation with national
authorities, reporting criminal offenses that take place on their platforms, and
greater transparency regarding how their content suggestion algorithms work.75
Failure to comply with these new rules could lead to fines of up to six percent
of the platform’s annual revenue.76
Some national attempts, however, have been much harsher with regards to
requirements placed on intermediaries, and highlight the potential risks of
government overregulation. A primary example of this is the 2017 German
“Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz” or “NetzDG” law,77 which was designed to
keep internet companies responsible for the content shared through their
services.78 It did this by creating a litany of new duties for intermediaries.
Companies would be required to establish new processes to deal with reports on
their platforms regarding “manifestly unlawful content” (defined as a violation
of one of twenty different provisions of the German Criminal Code), remove
said content within twenty-four hours of receiving notice of a violating post,
make monthly reviews of how reports are handled, and publish bi-annual reports
on their processes.79 A single failure to comply with any of these requirements
could potentially result in a fifty million Euro fine.80 However, the law drew
criticism for encouraging companies to err on the side of caution and remove
content more broadly rather than face the risk of a heavy fine.81 United Nations
73. Liability shields were common in the early 2000s, but none went to quite the extent that Section 230
did. See Council Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 12, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 12 (EC); Broadcastings Services Act 1992
(Cth) s 91(1) (Austl.); Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 § 73-76 (S. Afr.).
74. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market for Digital
Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, COM (2020) 825 final (Dec. 15, 2020).
75. Id. at Explanatory Memorandum.
76. Id. at art. 59.
77. Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], June 27, 2017 (Ger.).
78. While the law was originally aimed at social media companies, the definitions used are broad enough
to capture many more internet platforms. See Overview of the NetzDG Network Enforcement Law, CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH. (July 17, 2017), https://cdt.org/insights/overview-of-the-netzdg-network-enforcementlaw.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Germany: Flawed Social Media Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/
news/2018/02/14/germany-flawed-social-media-law.
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Special Rapporteur for the Protection of Freedom of Opinion and Expression
(“Special Rapporteur”) David Kaye also claimed that the law’s restrictions on
speech without a system of judicial oversight was not compatible with
international human rights law.82
NetzDG’s effect has not been limited to just Germany and German content;
it has also been described by think tank Justitia as a “prototype” for similar
platform moderation laws around the world.83 In the years that followed
NetzDG’s passage, over a dozen different countries passed broad laws removing
intermediary immunity and imposing content moderation obligations on
platforms.84 Almost all of them cited or referenced NetzDG as inspiration.85
Some of these laws, like those in Vietnam and Russia, even contain language
that directly mirrors specific clauses found in NetzDG.86 The most notable of
these was the May 2020 French “Loi Avia,” which similarly required platforms
to take down “manifestly illegal content” within twenty-four hours of a report
and imposed harsh fines on platforms that failed to do so.87 However, the law
was later struck down in almost its entirety by the French Constitutional
Council.88
Instead of directly doling out these harsh punishments onto platforms, what
about a new regulatory body to help guide and oversee them? Some have
considered this approach, but public response has been mixed. For example, in
2019, the United Kingdom, also inspired by NetzDG,89 suggested in its “Online
Harms White Paper” new laws that would create an independent regulatory body
(funded by a tax on internet platforms) that would have the legal authority to
establish standards for what is and is not permissible online, and the authority to
take action against platforms that fail to comply.90 But this approach has also
been criticized as state regulation of speech91 and creating financial and legal

82. David Kaye (Special Rapporteur for the Protection of Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Mandate
of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
OL DEU 1/2017 (June 1, 2017).
83. JACOB MCHANGAMA & JOELLE FISS, THE DIGITAL BERLIN WALL: HOW GERMANY (ACCIDENTALLY)
CREATED A PROTOTYPE FOR GLOBAL ONLINE CENSORSHIP 6 (2019).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 6–16.
86. Id. at 8, 13.
87. Jacob Schulz, What’s Going on with France’s Online Hate Speech Law?, LAWFARE (June 23, 2020),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/whats-going-frances-online-hate-speech-law#.
88. Aurelian Breeden, French Court Strikes Down Most of Online Hate Speech Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 18,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/world/europe/france-internet-hate-speech-regulation.html.
89. MCHANGAMA & FISS, supra note 83 at 12.
90. JEREMY WRIGHT & SAJID JAVID, ONLINE HARMS WHITE PAPER 53–63 (2019),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/973939/Onli
ne_Harms_White_Paper_V2.pdf. However, in 2020, the UK government announced that it would instead
bestow these powers upon the country’s Office of Communication. Regulator Ofcom to Have More Powers
Over UK Social Media, BBC (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-51446665.
91. Alex Hern, Internet Crackdown Raises Fears for Free Speech in Britain, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 8,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/apr/08/online-laws-threaten-freedom-of-speech-ofmillions-of-britons.
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barriers for smaller companies that might have difficulty implementing new
compliant systems.92
The scope of platform-focused regulation is an important sticking point for
most of these approaches, and governments must be careful in their attempts to
not overregulate. But perhaps the more important issue with this approach is
something even more fundamental: the fact that they are designed to make
moderation and liability platform-centric. Economist Steven Levitt remarked in
an interview with YouTube CEO Susan Wojcicki that devoting resources to
implement systems that simply remove harmful content from platforms does not
properly account for the fact that content moderation is, in the language of game
theory, a “repeated game.”93 A repeated game is one where there are many,
sometimes infinite, instances of the same interaction over a period of time;94
exactly the kind of situation that platforms and regulators face when there is a
constant stream of new content being posted. Consistently playing the game of
moderation with offenders and developing countermeasures may work in the
short run to remove content soon after posting, but in the long run, a proper
solution would need to end the game entirely. It needs to cut off the flow of
harmful content onto platforms, rather than trying to clean up spills as fast as
possible.
B. USER-FOCUSED REGULATIONS
That may be why some countries have instead, as Levitt posited would be
a much more efficient use of resources, opted to focus on laws that punish
individual users or organizations for creating harmful content. By creating this
disincentive, these countries seek to stop the problem at its source and deter users
from generating the offending content in the first place. Theoretically, doing so
would thereby remove the bad actors, leading to a lessened need for platforms
and policymakers to engage in moderation in the first place and keeping
discussion online more open and unrestricted.
This user-focused approach has seen a growth in popularity throughout the
last few years. In 2019, Russia passed a law holding individuals that spread what
the government considers to be false information liable for up to approximately
$7,600 in fines, with even stricter fines if the information causes injury, death,
or a disturbance of public order.95 In 2020, seemingly in response to a rise in
COVID-19 misinformation, those penalties were made even more severe, with
92. Adam Satariano, Britain to Create Regulator for Internet Content, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/12/technology/britain-internet-regulator.html.
93. Steven D. Levitt, Susan Wojcicki: “Hey, Let’s Go Buy YouTube!”, FREAKONOMICS, at 23:57 (Oct. 16,
2020), https://freakonomics.com/podcast/pima-susan-wojcicki.
94. Game Theory III: Repeated Games, POLICONOMICS, https://policonomics.com/lp-game-theory3repeated-game (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
95. Astghik Grigoryan, Russia: Russian President Signs Anti-fake News Laws, LIB. OF CONG. (Apr. 11,
2019),
https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2019-04-11/russia-russian-president-signs-anti-fakenews-laws.
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individuals facing up to approximately $25,000 in fines and up to five years in
prison.96 Malaysia passed a similar law in 2018 that would impose up to
approximately $119,000 in fines and prison terms of up to six years.97 While
that specific legislation was repealed soon after the party in control of parliament
changed,98 the new government then turned around and used emergency powers
granted for COVID-19 pandemic purposes to enact a similar ordinance only a
few years later.99 Neighboring Singapore passed its own version of the law in
2019, allowing any government minister to unilaterally declare a statement to be
false and issue authorities to take action.100 It also added the ability for
Singaporean officials to extend their reach extraterritorially, as long as the
communication itself is made “in Singapore.”101
China is especially notorious for cracking down on dissidents, and its
actions and approach in the context of harmful content online are no different.
For over two decades, the Measures for Security, Protection, and Administration
of the International Networking of Computer Information Networks have
outlawed the creation and spread of harmful content online, including
“information that fabricates or distorts facts, spreads rumors and disrupts social
order,” and “information that openly insults others or fabricates facts to slander
others.”102 These regulations were later re-codified under its 2016 Cybersecurity
Law.103 But despite its strict regulation of what citizens can and cannot read or
write, it has seen a significant rise in “rumors,” the word used to describe what
Americans might call fake news.104 To combat this, it has required users to
register their real identities with internet service providers,105 and has amended
its criminal laws to punish the spread of rumors with up to a seven-year prison
96. Daria Litvinova, Russia Fines Opposition Radio Station for Fake News, A.P. NEWS (June 19, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/47b0ee05dd531c693c860e4c05766775.
97. Anti-Fake News Act, Act 803, pt. II, s 4(1), (Apr. 9, 2018) (Malay.).
98. Reuters Staff, Malaysia Parliament Scraps Law Penalizing Fake News, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-politics-fakenews/malaysia-parliament-scraps-law-penalizing%20fake-news-idUSKBN1WO1H6.
99. Joseph Sipalan, Malaysia Defends Coronavirus Fake News Law amid Outcry, REUTERS (Mar. 12,
2021, 12:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/malaysia-politics/malaysia-defends-coronavirus-fake-newslaw-amid-outcry-idUSL4N2LA2EX.
100. Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act, No. 18 of 2019, pt. 3 s 10 (Sing.).
101. Id. at pt. 2, s 7 (Sing.).
102. Jisuanji Xinxi Wangluo Guoji Lianwang Anquan Baohu Guanli Banfa (计算机信息网络国际联网安
全保护管理办法) [Measures for Security, Protection, and Administration of the International Networking of
Computer Information Networks] (promulgated by the Ministry of Public Security, Dec. 30, 1997, effective Dec.
30,
1997),
at
art.
5,
translated
in
LAWINFOCHINA,
https://www.lawinfochina.com/
display.aspx?id=6247&lib=law.
103. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wangluo Anquan Fa (中华人民共和国网络安全法) [Cybersecurity
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress, Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017), art. 12, translated in LAWINFOCHINA,
https://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=22826&lib=law#.
104. LANEY ZHANG, GRACELA RODRIGUEZ-FERRAND, EDOUARDI SOARES, TARIQ AHMAD, & LANEY
ZHANG, LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, INITIATIVES TO COUNTER FAKE NEWS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 18 (2019),
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1181&context=scholcom.
105. Id. at 20.
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sentence.106 Network operators also must keep track of users and their posts, and
report to the authorities if a violation is detected.107 And recently, citizens were
encouraged to “enthusiastically report harmful information” by other citizens
who “spread ‘mistaken opinions.’”108
While these four countries are not the only ones to implement user-focused
moderation laws, all four do share one commonality that highlights an inherent
danger in taking this approach: they all have governments notorious for
engaging in the suppression of divisive or unpopular speech. Freedom House’s
2020 indices rated these four countries as either not free (Russia, China) or only
partly free (Malaysia, Singapore) in Global Freedom and Internet Freedom.109
While strict punishments for the spread of harmful content can act as a powerful
deterrent, they require governments to restrain themselves from broad
application. Many of these laws define their terminology extremely vaguely,
leaving citizens unsure of the exact boundaries of acceptability on the internet.
Therefore, there exists a fear that other authoritarian governments around the
world will use digital concerns to justify similarly vague laws, affording them
even greater control over what their citizens can access online regardless of
whether that content is truly harmful.110 And like with platform-focused
regulations, when the rules are not clear to users, it creates a chilling effect on
speech.111 Many may choose to err on the side of caution and restrain themselves
from speaking about topics that could potentially get them in trouble.
User-focused laws also may implicate potential human rights violations
while trying to prevent the spread of harmful content. The United Nations has
taken a leading role in espousing this view, insisting that government policies
online must be crafted in a way that respects the rights of individuals.112 For
example, it noted in 2018 that legislation implemented by a member state,
facially designed to criminalize the sharing of false information online, was
instead used to silence dissent, and thus “cast[ed] a hostile shadow over the
exercise of civil liberties.”113 The Special Rapporteur also recommended that
“[s]tates should repeal any law that criminalizes or unduly restricts expression,
106. Id. at 19.
107. Id. at 20–21.
108. Lauren Giella, China Encourages Citizens to Report Each Other for Posting ‘Mistaken Opinions’ on
Internet, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 19, 2021, 11:07 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/china-encourages-citizensreport-each-other-posting-mistaken-opinions-internet-1584696.
109. Freedom on the Net, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net (last visited Jan.
24, 2022) (scroll down; then click “Explore the Map”; then click on either “Internet Freedom” or “Global
Freedom”).
110. Adrian Shahbaz, Freedom on the Net 2018: The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism, FREEDOM HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
111. Reno, 521 U.S. at 871–72 (“[T]he CDA is a content-based regulation of speech. The vagueness of such
a regulation raises special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech.”).
112. Wafa Ben-Hassine, Government Policy for the Internet Must be Rights-Based and User-Centered, U.
N. CHRON., https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/government-policy-internet-must-be-rights-based-anduser-centred (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
113. Id.
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online and offline,” in the interest of protecting platforms of public
expression.114
C. EDUCATION-BASED SOLUTIONS
One possible way to get around the issues that come with directly punishing
users who post harmful content is to instead focus on limiting the harm they can
cause to the public. The goal with this approach seems to be to create an
enlightened version of the “marketplace of ideas,”115 where not only the ideas
themselves clash to leave truth alone standing, but where the individual also has
the competency to parse all the information and come to their own informed
conclusions. To accomplish that, governments generally engage in public
initiatives that raise awareness about certain topics or educate individual users
on how to avoid the dangers of harmful content on the internet.
Nordic countries have led the way with these types of initiatives by
establishing cooperative efforts throughout different sectors of society.116 For
example, Sweden has engaged in a massive effort to educate its citizens about
misinformation, rather than trying to stop its spread with legislation.117 Its Civil
Contingencies Agency envisioned as early as 2013 a potential future in which
“it may be difficult to distinguish public relations from news and [where] rogue
news sources could have a major impact.”118 As part of its efforts to prevent this
scenario, it published a 2018 pamphlet detailing how to counter “information
influence activities.”119 The pamphlet details how communicators, such as
public officials and influential organizations, can recognize and combat these
activities.120 It teaches what to look for in news articles, how to recognize bots,
and how to address a target audience to counter the misinformation or
disinformation.121 Another pamphlet was created for the general population,
urging citizens to be on the lookout for false information and to critically
114. David Kaye (Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35 (Apr. 6, 2018) (emphasis added).
115. The “marketplace of ideas” was a theory by John Stuart Mill espousing that because no one can know
the truth, ideas in a free society could compete in the marketplace for truth and acceptability. Better ideas would
be more successful in this marketplace, while bad, harmful, or outdated ideas would naturally fail. David Schultz
& David Hudson, Marketplace of Ideas, FREE SPEECH CTR. (June 2017), https://www.mtsu.edu/firstamendment/article/999/marketplace-of-ideas.
116. MARTINA CHAPMAN, MAPPING OF MEDIA LITERACY PRACTICES AND ACTIONS IN EU-28 at 134–44,
170–81, 338–47 (Maja Cappello, Francisco Javier Cabrera Blázquez & Sophie Valais eds., 2016),
https://rm.coe.int/1680783500.
117. OLGA ROBINSON, ALISTAIR COLEMAN, & SHAYAN SARFARIZADEH, A REPORT OF ANTIDISINFORMATION INITIATIVES 4 (2019), https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/08/AReport-of-Anti-Disinformation-Initiatives.pdf.
118. SWEDISH CIV. CONTINGENCIES AGENCY, FIVE CHALLENGING FUTURE SCENARIOS FOR SOCIETAL
SECURITY 25 (2013), https://www.msb.se/siteassets/dokument/publikationer/english-publications/fivechallenging-future-scenarios-for-societal-security.pdf.
119. SWEDISH CIV. CONTINGENCIES AGENCY, COUNTERING INFORMATION INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES 7 (2018),
https://www.msb.se/RibData/Filer/pdf/28698.pdf.
120. Id.
121. SWEDISH CIV. CONTINGENCIES AGENCY, supra note 118, at 22, 24, 32.
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appraise all sources.122 And finally, these educational efforts have also been
aimed at the country’s youngest demographic, with popular cartoon character
Bamse the Bear being recruited to help teach young children about the dangers
of fake news.123
Other countries around the world have also pursued education to combat
disinformation. Kenya, in partnership with the U.S. Embassy in the country,
established the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) Checks campaign in
2018 to help young Kenyans learn to spot misinformation.124 It teaches a threestep process: (1) stop before you share, (2) reflect on what you see or read, and
(3) verify that the information is accurate.125 The campaign website provides
quizzes, workbooks, and games to help users understand and improve on their
media literacy skills, and various events over the course of the program’s first
year provided additional support and learning opportunities.
So far, the educational approach seems to be quite effective. A few years
after their programs went into effect, Nordic countries have ranked among the
highest in Europe for media literacy,126 and young Kenyans were ranked in the
upper midrange for African countries.127 But while the results are clear, the
reasons for this success are not. For example, Finland (another Nordic country
that has been seen internationally as a paragon for how to fight fake news) ranks
highest in many other quality-of-life indices as well, causing some to interpret
this fostering a better environment for education approaches, thus leaving less
room for malicious actors to use misinformation to sow division.128 Yet that fails
to explain how Kenya, with a quality-of-life that is relatively much poorer129 still
managed to rank highly in comparison to other African countries. Further
research should be conducted on the efficacy of these programs in different
regions around the world and what factors are contributing to success.

122. SWEDISH CIV. CONTINGENCIES AGENCY, IF CRISIS OR WAR COMES 6 (2018),
https://www.dinsakerhet.se/siteassets/dinsakerhet.se/broschyren-om-krisen-eller-kriget-kommer/om-kriseneller-kriget-kommer---engelska-2.pdf.
123. Lee Roden, Why This Swedish Comic Hero Is Going to Teach Kids About Fake News, THE LOCAL (Jan.
16, 2017), https://www.thelocal.se/20170116/why-this-swedish-comic-hero-is-going-to-teach-kids-about-fakenews-bamse.
124. Ambassador Godec and U.S. Embassy Counter Fake News with Media Literacy Campaign, U.S.
EMBASSY IN KENYA (Mar. 14, 2018), https://web.archive.org/web/20190319142019/https:/ke.usembassy.gov/
ambassador-godec-u-s-embassy-counter-fake-news-media-literacy-campaign/.
125. YALIChecks, YOUNG AFR. LEADERS INITIATIVE, https://yali.state.gov/checks (last visited Jan. 24,
2022).
126. MARTIN LESSENKI, JUST THINK ABOUT IT. FINDINGS OF THE MEDIA LITERACY INDEX 2019, at 5 (2019).
127. Critical but Less Creative: Media and Information Literacy Amongst Kenya’s Youth, DW AKADEMIE
(Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.dw.com/en/critical-but-less-creative-media-and-information-literacy-amongstkenyas-youth/a-55273817.
128. Eliza Mackintosh, Finland Is Winning the War on Fake News. What It’s Learned May Be Crucial to
Western Democracy, CNN (May 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2019/05/europe/finland-fake-newsintl/.
129. Kenya is ranked 143 on the UN Human Development Index, compared to Finland at rank 11. Latest
Human Development Index Ranking, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/latest-humandevelopment-index-ranking (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
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V. APPLYING THESE APPROACHES TO THE UNITED STATES
A. GOVERNMENT-ENACTED SOLUTIONS
The current content moderation system in the United States is not working.
Citizens, policymakers, and even the internet intermediaries themselves all agree
on this one point. As such, it is time for the government to step in and assist with
moderation efforts. Foundationally, this may be at odds with the idea of the
United States’ prized free market system, where companies should be at liberty
to do what they want on their platforms. But the reality is that allowing the
system to remain relatively free from government regulation has not resulted in
a market solution to the dissemination of harmful content in the more than two
decades since consumer internet access has become ubiquitous. Platforms have
been pressured for years to find and implement solutions on their own, but the
recent spike in disinformation shows that we are still far away from the day that
such an approach can work.
Even the optimistic scenario in which platforms can independently
moderate their content with reasonable success may not be a desirable one. The
largest tech companies today possess near-monopolies on some of the most
commonly used channels of communication and information dissemination.130
For example: this Note was inspired by posts made by a government official on
Twitter;131 it was written and edited using software made by Microsoft;132 and
research on the competing views and approaches in this area was done using
Google’s search engine133 on sites with content that is likely hosted on either
Amazon, Google, or Microsoft’s cloud services.134 Allowing these massive
private companies to unilaterally decide, with minimal requirements for
accountability or transparency, what is and is not allowed on the internet, may
lead to the rules of the web being determined by market forces and business
decisions instead of morality and ethics.135
130. Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L. REV. 1353, 1385 (2018); Brian
Fung, Congress’ Big Tech Investigation Finds Companies Wield ‘Monopoly Power’, CNN BUSINESS (Oct. 6,
2020, 9:12 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/06/tech/congress-big-tech-antitrust-report/index.html.
131. Ajit Pai (@AjitPai), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2020, 11:30 AM), https://twitter.com/ajitpai/status/
1316808733805236226?lang=en.
132. Microsoft Windows possesses 88% of the personal computer operating system market share. Nat Levy,
Windows 10 Market Share Passes 50% as Microsoft Continues to Dominate Traditional PC Market, GEEKWIRE
(Sept. 3, 2019, 6:53 AM), https://www.geekwire.com/2019/windows-10-market-share-passes-50-microsoftcontinues-dominate-traditional-pc-market (“The latest figures show how dominant Windows remains in the PC
arena, with a market share of roughly 88 percent.”).
133. Google’s search engine accounts for more than 90% of all web searches made. Jeff Desjardins, How
Google Retains More Than 90% of Market Share, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 23, 2018, 4:35 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-google-retains-more-than-90-of-market-share-2018-4.
134. Felix Richter, Amazon Leads $150-Billion Cloud Market, STATISTA (July 5, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/chart/18819/worldwide-market-share-of-leading-cloud-infrastructure-serviceproviders.
135. Langvardt, supra note 130, at 1387 (“Under such a system, the shape of free speech will be determined
by popular opinion, market pressures, governmental pressures, and managerial conscience.”); Rob Reich,
Mehran Sahami & Jeremy M. Weinstein, Facebook Isn’t the Only Problem, CNN BUS. (Oct. 14, 2021),
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But while some government regulations will be necessary, regulations as
strict as those seen abroad are likely not compatible with American society and
its values. A NetzDG-esque system of strict rules and heavy fines focused on
punishing platforms could stunt the growth of online communications, and even
potentially run afoul of the Constitution as either a limitation on free speech or
an excessive fine. Alternatively, attempts to crack down on dangerous users
through lengthy prison terms and fines could go beyond necessary moderation
for safety and instead become state suppression of speech. New regulation
certainly needs to be enacted, but it must be done so in a way that minimally
impacts the country’s longstanding principles regarding speech and business
operation. We can do this through a three-pronged approach involving a
restructuring of the government’s platform-based approach, a moderate increase
in the user-focused disincentives for disinformation, and a heavy cross-sector
push for more media literacy education.
1. Amending Section 230
First, platform-focused regulations must undoubtedly resolve the Section
230 issue. While the foundational principles of the law are sound, it gives
intermediaries too much protection for too little work and acts as a barrier to
keeping them responsible for the things that happen on their platforms. During
his presidential campaign, President Biden called for Section 230 to be revoked,
but only for companies that knowingly propagate falsehoods.136 This likely
would not work for two reasons. First, the standard President Biden proposed
seems simple on its face but would be confusing in practice. In the era of
automated content algorithms that push out exactly the content that users are
seeking themselves, what does it even mean to “knowingly propagate” a
falsehood? One might say that Facebook or Twitter are not necessarily actively
choosing to spread disinformation, as opposed to users abusing their platform’s
automated technology to do so (although President Biden argued that Facebook
was knowingly propagating falsehoods).137 And if a platform can only be held
liable if, say, a human makes the final decision, what happens to a platform when
its human content moderator makes a close judgment call, or its software
engineer tweaks the algorithm? Basing the standard on subjective knowledge
could create many difficult situations and unintended consequences.
Second, the standard seems to conflict with the good faith exception and
may disincentivize moderation. There is an immense amount of content that is

https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/14/perspectives/facebook-frances-haugen-big-tech-regulation/index.html (“But
the push to scale new technologies quickly and achieve market dominance makes it even more likely that societal
harms aren't fully considered until the negative consequences become evident and inescapable.”).
136. Editorial Board, Joe Biden Former Vice President of the United States, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-interview.html.
137. Id. (“It should be revoked because [Facebook] is not merely an internet company. It is propagating
falsehoods they know to be false . . . .”).
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posted daily on the internet.138 Why would a platform bother to moderate any of
it in good faith and work hard to protect its users when that good faith could just
as easily be labeled as propagation? Platforms would then run the risk of making
a mistake (or even simply an unpopular decision), being stigmatized for it, and
losing all their Section 230 protection. The rational-actor CEO of any platform
in such a situation would instead choose to turn a blind eye to content moderation
beyond what is necessary, bringing the whole issue back to where it started in
1996.
Section 230 should stand but be amended to create a higher bar than “good
faith” necessary to obtain the exemption for moderation.139 As is, the exemption
is inherently subjective and allows for an “I’m trying my best” defense to
liability for platforms to fall back on. We live in the age of information and data,
and the standards for liability should reflect this. Therefore, Congress should
transition to an objective standard for whether platforms are moderating in such
a way that they should get some relief for the posts they do happen to miss.
Platforms big and small collect data on content they moderate140, so that data
could be repurposed to create an objective metric for the success or failure of the
platform’s moderation. Perfection is impossible, and the effectiveness of
approaches may wax and wane, but if, very roughly speaking, 99.5% of harmful
content is removed within twenty-four hours of it being posted,141 then that
platform should qualify for protection for liability. Otherwise, they would be
subject to a reasonable amount in fines based on a multitude of factors, such as
the nature of the content, the harm caused, and the contribution of the content to
public discourse. This way, companies that are loosely moderating and catching
very little harmful content are not automatically given protection, and all
companies are given a concrete goal to strive for in improving their content
moderation systems.

138. In 2018, it was estimated that 2.5 quintillion bytes of data were created each day. Bernard Marr, How
Much Data Do We Create Every Day? The Mind-Blowing Stats Everyone Should Read, FORBES (May 21, 2018,
12:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/21/how-much-data-do-we-create-every-daythe-mind-blowing-stats-everyone-should-read/?sh=4f61a7bc60ba.
139. Facebook, Google, and Twitter’s CEOs suggested this kind of change to Section 230 in a March 25,
2021 appearance before the House Energy and Commerce Committee. Dylan Byers, Zuckerberg Calls for
Changes to Tech’s Section 230 Protections, NBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2021, 6:44 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/rcna486. Their suggestion additionally called for a proportionality element to the standard, where smaller
companies with fewer resources to devote to moderation are held to a lower standard than larger companies.
140. See, e.g., Rules Enforcement, TWITTER (Jan. 11, 2021), https://transparency.twitter.com/en/reports/
rules-enforcement.html#2020-jan-jun; Guy Rosen, Community Standards Enforcement Report, FACEBOOK (Feb.
11, 2021), https://about.fb.com/news/2021/02/community-standards-enforcement-report-q4-2020.
141. To be sure, 0.5% of all harmful posts making it through filters would still result in thousands, if not
millions of posts evading detection. See Marr, supra note 138. The threshold suggested is simply an example of
how such a system might work; in practice, the cutoff point may have to be much higher, or it may have to vary
based on the size of a given platform’s userbase.
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2. Creating a Government Body to Help Standardize Content Guidelines
and Platform Enforcement
To avoid a NetzDG situation142 in which platforms avoid harsh fines by
erring on the side of caution and removing broad amounts of content to bring up
their metrics, the federal government should additionally cooperate with
platforms to provide independent oversight for the review process and ensure
that policies are fair and consistently enforced. This can be done either through
an independent federal agency or the judiciary. While this involvement should
avoid going as far as enforcement of state-created rules or guidelines, like what
the UK suggested in its white paper,143 this body should at minimum (1) help
platforms standardize their rules as to what content is acceptable, and (2) provide
an arbitration process for content moderation decisions that users believe are
incorrect. Facebook implemented an independent review board in 2020,144
which operates similarly to how an appellate court might hear a discretionary
appeal.145 Some praise it for setting new precedents for how platforms can
approach self-moderation,146 and others have raised concerns about the scope of
its review and the extent of its actual authority over Facebook decisions and
policy.147 The government could look to build further on this concept and design
its own body for appeals with input from platforms and industry experts.
Alternatively, the government could work in tandem with the Oversight Board
and its future counterparts at other platforms by providing them with the
necessary guidance and resources to tackle the amount of content they are
required to moderate daily.
3. Increasing Individual Disincentives for Disinformation
Because only regulating platforms does not address the core issue of
malicious netizens, user-focused laws will still be a necessary evil in a holistic
and effective content moderation solution. Currently, federal law provides for
fines and prison terms for those who spread false information, but only on very
specific topics.148 These penalties are also increased significantly if the

142. See supra Subpart IV.A.
143. WRIGHT & JAVID, supra note 90.
144. Oversight Board Charter, OVERSIGHT BD., https://www.oversightboard.com/governance (last visited
Jan. 24, 2022).
145. Users can appeal Facebook’s decisions to the board, submit materials to argue its case to the board,
and then a five-member panel will vote and provide a written opinion on the decision they reach. Kate Klonick,
The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent Institution to Adjudicate Online Free Expression,
129 YALE L.J. 2418, 2469–74 (2020).
146. Id. at 2418 (“Ultimately, the Feature concludes that the Facebook Oversight Board has great potential
to set new precedent for user participation in private platforms’ governance and a user right to procedure in
content moderation.”).
147. Taylor Hatmaker, Facebook’s Controversial Oversight Board Starts Reviewing Content Moderation
Cases, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 22, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/10/22/facebook-oversight-boardcontroversy.
148. 18 U.S.C. § 35 (1994).
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information leads to serious bodily injury or death.149 However, there are no
applicable laws for the more common types of disinformation seen on online
platforms today, like political or medical disinformation. Therefore, Congress
should look to create an analog to these statutes for those types of disinformation
but should take care to limit its application only to situations in which the
information leads to injury or death. A statute too broad in its potential
application, like the one found in Singapore,150 could be dangerous in the hands
of government officials who could abuse the statute to suppress opposition
viewpoints. Limiting it scope to only cases where injury or death occurs would
thereby require a minimum threshold result to take place before the statute could
be invoked, preventing abuse.
4. Implementing Education Programs through a Cross-Sector Push
It seems from the results abroad that education may be the most effective
weapon against disinformation, while simultaneously being least intrusive on
First Amendment rights. Media literacy programs for students have been
sporadically introduced throughout several cities and states,151 and there has
been a recent push for state legislation requiring media literacy to be
incorporated into the curriculum,152 but much more can still be done. Schoolage Americans, or those under eighteen, comprise only a quarter of the
population,153 leaving the other three-quarters without much in terms of media
literacy resources. Many of the victims of disinformation are typically older and
did not grow up with the internet as a core part of their lives.154 Providing more
resources for this large portion of the population to learn media literacy skills
could be an important step towards solving the issue.
To address this gap, there should be a cross-sector push, like those in the
Nordic countries, to bring these programs to as many people as possible. Nonprofits could establish programs to help reach those who are older, or employers
could run training sessions for their employees. Traditional media outlets could
make use of their reach to send out public services announcements or promote
media literacy programs to a broader audience. Full-population media literacy
may take decades to achieve, but any small step taken toward increasing the
percentage of the media-literate population is a step towards reducing the effects
and harms of disinformation campaigns.
149. 18 U.S.C. § 1038 (2006).
150. Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act, No. 18 of 2019, pt. 3 s 10 (Sing).
151. Alina Tugend, These Students Are Learning About Fake News and How to Spot It, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/education/learning/news-literacy-2016-election.html.
152. MEDIA LITERACY NOW, U.S. MEDIA LITERACY POLICY REPORT 2020 6 (2020),
https://medialiteracynow.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/U.S.-Media-Literacy-Policy-Report-2020.pdf.
153. QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/AGE2951#
AGE295219 (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
154. Alexa Lardieri, Older People More Susceptible to Fake News, More Likely to Share It, U.S. NEWS (Jan.
9, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2019-01-09/study-older-people-are-more-susceptibleto-fake-news-more-likely-to-share-it.
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B. PLATFORM-ENACTED SOLUTIONS
Action by the government does not necessarily mean that platforms can sit
back and do nothing. Because the above approaches opt for only a baseline level
of control and regulation over how platforms choose to operate, it will also be
important for platforms themselves to develop effective systems to moderate
their content so they can keep their users safe and qualify for their immunity.
The internet was originally seen as a place where people, no matter how
far away, could come together to form communities with each other. But today,
companies that run the largest online platforms seem to act more like quasigovernments than they do tools to help users create communities. They are the
judge, jury, and executioner of their own platforms: they create their own rules
and guidelines that users must follow, make internal content moderation
decisions on whether users have violated those rules, and then carry out
punishment themselves. For most of the larger platforms, nothing keeps them
accountable for their moderation actions beyond the occasional social outrage
and cycle of bad press. Users are completely locked out of the decision-making
process, and often have no idea what is going on internally at the company. It is
no surprise that some groups feel like the biggest tech companies are actively
working to stifle certain viewpoints given the lack of clarity surrounding how
platform rules are enforced.155
1. Designing Platform Content Guidelines Around Their Communities
To remedy these issues of size and transparency, we should look to rebuild
platforms and their rules from the ground up. If users can be likened to the
citizens, and the platforms to the government, then platforms could be designed
to provide users with a say in what the rules and guidelines the platform enforces
are. After all, community standards or guidelines, by definition, must be enacted
based on the desires of the community itself. In doing this, community standards
should be specific, and vary from location to location and group to group. Mark
Zuckerberg envisioned the Oversight Board to “reflect[] the social norms and
values of people all around the world,” but critics argue that there can be no such
thing as a global set of shared values that can govern across all online content.156
Reddit approaches this issue by returning to an older system not unlike
American federalism. Rather than providing users with one huge, messily
organized ocean of information that they can wade through, the site’s content is
all divided into user-created communities (called “subreddits”) that each house
discussion on a specific topic, like a sport or a political affiliation. While there
are general commonsense sitewide rules that all users must follow (such as
respecting other users’ privacy or refraining from posting illegal content),157
each subreddit’s members are free to create and enforce their own rules tailored
155. See Chappell & Tsioulcas, supra note 52.
156. Klonick, supra note 145, at 2474–75.
157. Reddit Content Policy, REDDIT (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.redditinc.com/policies/content-policy.
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specifically for their content.158 This brings some transparency159 to the
moderation process, allowing users to feel like they have a part in the system
and are in control of their own communities. An analog to this could be
implemented at all kinds of online platforms, from new social media to oldschool forums. For example, Twitter recently announced the implementation of
its own “Birdwatch” program, which would allow users to participate in
identifying and countering misinformation by empowering them to identify
information in Tweets and add context in the form of supplemental
information.160
An alternative, or perhaps a supplement, to dividing existing platforms into
smaller subcommunities would be to encourage the growth of small or mediumsized platforms. Large platforms like Facebook or YouTube benefit immensely
from the network effect, whereby their large user base makes them the “place to
be,” attracting more users that want to be on the same platforms as people they
want to connect with.161 But this comes with two main costs. First, users join
Facebook not because it has tools that no other social media platform does, but
because they often feel like they have no other option to avoid being left out of
the conversation.162 This immense population makes large platforms prime
targets for abuse by malicious individuals or foreign social media campaigns
that want to influence as large of an audience as possible. Second, community
moderation on these large platforms can often be difficult to encourage, because
the average user lacks any incentive to volunteer their time to help a multibilliondollar corporation solve its issues.163
A natural solution to these problems is to encourage user migration to
smaller social media platforms. When online discourse is happening not between
faceless names on the internet, but between people in close-knit social groups,
there can be more incentives for users to abide by rules of conduct and keep
others on the platform accountable. While these small platforms could never
fully make a Facebook-sized platform completely obsolete, they are not
designed with that goal in mind. Instead, they cater to specific niches and groups
by altering their scope and purpose. One example of this is Front Porch Forum,
a hyperlocal social media platform that limits membership and discussion to
158. Reddit 101, REDDIT (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.reddit.com/wiki/reddit_101 (“Don’t think of Reddit
as one giant community. This site is made up of ‘sub’reddits, which are all their own communities. Every single
post you see on this site belongs to its own community, with its own set of users, and with its own set of rules.”).
159. Some have argued that this system still does not bring enough transparency to the platform. Prerna
Juneja, Deepika Rama Subramanian & Tanushree Mitra, Through the Looking Glass: Study of Transparency in
Reddit’s Moderation Practices, 4 PROCS. ACM ON HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION, no. 4, 2020, at 1 (“Our results
reveal a lack of transparency in moderation practices.”).
160. Keith Coleman, Introducing Birdwatch, a Community-Based Approach to Misinformation, TWITTER:
BLOG (Jan. 25, 2021), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2021/introducing-birdwatch-a-communitybased-approach-to-misinformation.
161. Caroline Banton, Network Effect, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 3, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/
n/network-effect.asp.
162. Venkatesh, supra note 55, at 21:55.
163. Id. at 26:23.
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residents of the same neighborhoods in Vermont, parts of New York state, and
one town in Massachusetts and New Hampshire each.164 In this more intimate
setting, where all the users live only minutes away from each other, everyone
has a vested interest in keeping discussion in their neighborhoods civil and
healthy. It also allows for more localized moderation that adheres to the norms
of the participating neighborhoods.165
2. Using Algorithms Alongside Community Moderation
The use of algorithms, especially for moderation, will also be an important
issue for platforms going forward. As mentioned earlier, there are myriad issues
with the current implementations of automated moderation on social media
platforms.166 However, having some flaws does not mean they should be
abandoned completely; they are still a powerful tool that allows for much of the
harmful content uploaded online to be stopped before anyone is harmed by it.
Instead, the issue with algorithms stems from their current elevation to a status
where they are regarded as the solution to all problems that might arise in content
moderation.167 With that as a basis, platforms can use algorithms as an excuse to
defend their decisions as scientifically impartial.168
Unfortunately, belief in a supreme moderation system that works in
mysterious ways and engaging in blind adherence to its decisions abandons
critical thinking in favor of technophilia. Algorithms should instead be viewed
as tools that serve human ends, rather than ones that rule over our discourse. If
platforms truly want to play a part in creating safe communities and giving users
voices on the internet, they need to both clarify exactly how their algorithms
work and give users at least some input into how the systems are designed.
Companies are understandably hesitant to do this, as it would involve being very
open with how proprietary technologies core to their business models work. In
some cases, complete transparency may be impossible as machine learning
creates algorithms that function in ways that are increasingly beyond human

164. Where is Front Porch Forum Available?, FRONT PORCH F., https://frontporchforum.com/aboutus/service-area (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
165. See Venkatesh, supra note 55, at 27:55. Front Porch Forum employs “professional online community
managers,” but allows neighborhoods themselves to dictate the boundaries of conversation. See Is FPF for Me?,
FRONT PORCH F., https://frontporchforum.com/isfpfforme (under “Is FPF moderated?”) (last visited Jan. 24,
2022).
166. See supra Subpart III.A (discussing some of the issues with the current implementation of moderation
algorithms).
167. Sarah Jeong, AI is an Excuse for Facebook to Keep Messing Up, THE VERGE (Apr. 13, 2018, 2:41 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/13/17235042/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-ai-artificial-intelligence-excusecongress-hearings (“Mark Zuckerberg dodged question after question by citing the power of artificial
intelligence. Moderating hate speech? AI will fix it. Terrorist content and recruitment? AI again. Fake accounts?
AI. Russian misinformation? AI. Racially discriminatory ads? AI. Security? AI.”).
168. Gorwa et al., supra note 48, at 12 (“[A]utomation is associated with a ‘scientific’ impartiality that is
inherently attractive to platform companies, one that additionally lets them keep their decisions ‘non-negotiable’
and hidden from view.”) (internal citations omitted).
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comprehension.169 However, disclosure does not necessarily have to include any
code—the general design framework would be enough of a starting point. For
example, what problems was the system designed to solve? What did the
designers identify as key contributors to that problem? What does successful
implementation look like? By giving users both insight and input into how these
questions are answered, algorithms can be adjusted in ways to better suit the
needs of a platform’s users.
CONCLUSION
While the internet has grown immensely, it has also evolved beyond its
original role as a tool to let people communicate and access information. The
present laissez-faire system of internet governance has its merits, but it is flawed
operating on its own. The time has come for the government to step up and
correct some of the major issues plaguing online platforms today. This
correction would not and should not result in a state monopoly over the internet.
With slight changes to how platforms are held liable for user-generated content,
stronger deterrents for the creation of dangerous disinformation, and a
nationwide cross-sector push towards media literacy, these issues could be
remedied without significantly inhibiting our most foundational principle of
speech.
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